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During the innocent ‘80s and ‘90s, when the alternative dispute resolu­tion movement was younger, and I 
was too, I read some, though surely not all, of 
the articles opposing the ADR movement for 
its encouragement of settlements via court-
based, community, and private dispute resolu­
tion processes (mainly mediation). 
The most notable of these was Prof.
Owen Fiss’s Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J.
1073 (1983-1984) (available at https://bit. 
ly/2OCJupg). It decries the ADR movement’s 
impact on the public, the justice system, the 
polity, and sometimes the litigants.  
I recall other ADR opposition writ­
ers primarily concerned that disadvan­
taged or disempowered litigants were
settling for less in mediation than they
might have received at trial. I encoun­
tered these writings after a number of years
spent mediating legal disputes and, without
uncertainty or angst, dismissed them as rooted
in philosophy or narratives untethered to reality. 
Because philosophy was then, and still is, 
far outside my zones of comfort or engage­
ment, I made little or no effort to parse what 
I suspect were Fiss’s and others’ underlying 
objections to settlement. That quick rejection 
was based on their failure to describe what I 
knew to be litigants’ realities. 
Conscience untroubled, I kept mediat­
ing and advocating for well-designed dispute 
resolution processes, and eventually began 
teaching students, lawyers, and judges. 
Thirtyish years later, the #MeToo move­
ment, Stormy Daniels, Trump, Kava­
naugh, Alabama, Mueller aftermath, 
economic and environmental regu­
latory and legislative debacles, with 
Bush v. Gore as harbinger, provoke 
me to reflect more carefully. 
Are private mediated settlements
doing harm? Should they be discouraged or 
not encouraged, as opposed to what media­
tors and institutionalized ADR do?  
We mediate “in the shadow of the law.” 
Thus mediators and participants imbue the 
legal and political system with some trust. Is 
that naïve? Does the law’s shadow guide and 
protect us, or does it throw another type of 
shade? 
My initial call to reflection—call it
rumination—was the much-publicized rev­
elations of settlements and nondisclosure
agreements, best known as NDAs, in various
Stormy Daniels-type affairs and #MeToo
cases. So long ago. Not long after that,
we read of former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg’s NDAs.
I suspect these had a number of us media­
tors shifting uncomfortably in our chairs. 
Uninitiated friends and colleagues were sur­
prised by the idea that wrongdoing would be 
shielded and offenders would be free to target 
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The Master Mediator 
me to offer to my clients online—in-person
and also a mixed mediation, partly in per­
son and partly by zoom meetings. 
* * * 
Zoom is here to stay. 
The virus has done in a few months
what years of proselytizing has failed to do: 
Commentary 
(continued from front page) 
yet more victims, while continuing to enjoy 
outsized paychecks and professional influence. 
Mediators and lawyers had to explain to 
family and friends that, yes, private settlements 
are normal.  And settlement agreements that 
restrict public disclosure of their terms are a 
routine part of practice and process.  
It felt shady, irresponsible, callous,
immoral. 
ABSOLUTION AND CAVEATS 
So are mediator mea culpas required for pri­
vate settlements and nondisclosure terms? 
Much reading and reflection has led me 
mostly to absolution on the question of private 
mediated settlements and their NDAs, with 
some caveats and rough, tentative, no-doubt­
doomed proposals for exceptions in the public 
interest. 
Why? Because I strongly suspect that dis­
couraging or dampening public or private
ADR’s encouragement of settlements would 
not necessarily lead to more trials, but rather, 
to more settlements negotiated privately, with­
out mediator involvement. 
Some theoretical work-arounds—requir­
ing litigants to disclose mediated settlements or 
prohibiting NDAs in mediated settlements— 
would increase pressure for pre-suit, direct 
settlement, without mediated involvement.
Though the laudable goal would be more pub­
lic knowledge, a perverse consequence is likely 
to be greater pressure for pre-suit negotiation 
and settlement. 
normalize online mediation and other forms of 
dispute resolution as not only a viable option, 
but in many instances the first choice. 
The widespread use of Zoom and other 
online technologies will expand and be inte­
grated into the mainstream as just another tool 
on another day. Adaptive learning to deal with 
the impact that online forums have on human­
ization, compassion, empathy, emotions, trust, 
rapport, credibility will continue to evolve as 
humans adapt to the new normal or continue 
to Zoom on an ad hoc basis. 
At least in the current regime, the public 
has access to the claims filed, even if not their 
resolution.  Unless NDAs were prohibited for 
all legal claims, prohibiting them in mediated 
settlements would create greater incentives for 
pre-litigation direct settlements.  The result 
would be less, not more, public awareness of 
(alleged) misdeeds.  
The settlements between now-President
Trump and Stormy Daniels and other “simi­
larly situated” women were reached in law­
yer-to-lawyer negotiations. No mediator was 
involved.
Obviously, privacy was at least one party’s
main goal—hence the punitive terms for breach
of the NDA and the legal battle to enforce them.
Had the case been mediated after a court filing,
at least the allegations would have been subject
to press and public scrutiny.
Thus, even an optimistic and unrealis­
tic policy recommendation regarding NDAs 
would have to apply to all NDAs, not just to 
mediated or post filing settlements.  In short, 
NDAs are not an ADR problem, they are a legal 
system problem. As a mediator within that 
system, I am absolved of personal guilt for the 
many nondisclosure provisions contained in all 
manner of settlements in my mediation room.
That personal absolution begs the ques­
tion: When negotiating settlements where case 
facts make the lawyers, mediators, or (some) 
parties queasy about fear of future and/or
repeated public harm, should there be a cure or 
prophylactic treatment for their nausea? 
Remember, that sick feeling doesn’t occur 
just in cases about sexual harassment or assault 
or politicians’ sexual infidelities. Some may 
feel it when negotiating settlements of appar­
ently legitimate and possibly endemic race, 
As with any new product or service, inno­
vation will be quick and widely spread as
mediators and participants learn from experi­
mentation and experience on how to thrive in 
the new environment. 
The first time I saw or thought of two-way 
electronic communications was on Star Trek. 
We may think of Zoom as the progeny of Nyota 
Uhura who, for so many of us baby boomers 
and beyond, was an integral part of the voyage 
where no one has gone before. 
Go boldly, mediators. Go boldly.
disability, gender, and religious discrimination, 
of product liability claims, of environmental 
hazards.  The nausea comes from knowing that 
others may suffer serious harm in the future, 
harm that could have been avoided, if only the 
information were known. 
Indeed, as Arizona State University Prof. 
Art Hinshaw reminded us in a 2011 piece 
on the Indisputably blog, the public interest 
is sometimes better served by litigation and 
results that include court-enforced orders to 
protect citizens’ rights.  Art Hinshaw, “Owen 
Fiss and Sheriff Joe Arpaio–‘Against Settle­
ment,’” Indisputably (Dec. 28, 2011) (available 
at https://bit.ly/2OGMcKt). 
Using the well-covered dispute between 
the infamous Arizona Sheriff Arpaio and the 
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Divi­
sion, Hinshaw states his inarguably correct 
view—to my mind—that the people of Arizona 
were far better off with a fully litigated case and 
court order, and judicial supervision, than if 
the case had been settled in mediation. 
Laws intended to protect citizens’ rights 
must be applied and enforced.  Imagine medi­
ating that case and learning much of what was 
revealed in court.  Wouldn’t and shouldn’t the 
mediator feel ill if the parties had been willing 
to settle for terms that failed to protect the 
public, covered up proof of civil right viola­
tions, and potentially improved Arpaio’s or his 
buddies’ political chances? 
It seems clear that cases such as Arpaio’s 
should be subject to the court’s judgment and 
full public airing because of the wide and con­
sequential public interest at stake.  
It would seem that our current legal system 
would favor taking such cases to trial and reject 
private settlements. Or at least it should be. 
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State, municipal, and DOJ attorneys are 
referred to as “public interest lawyers” because 
they represent the public and are charged 
with acting in their client public’s interests. 
Indeed, as Prof. Hinshaw suggests in the
article cited above, when the Justice Depart­
ment negotiates in such cases, it typically 
asks for “pure capitulation, which, according 
to the local paper, was the result the 20 other 
times when it has targeted law-enforcement 
agencies for similar violations.” Ibid.  
The same is true for lawyers representing 
more specialized citizens advocacy groups. 
When their clients’ highest priorities are pub­
lic awareness, bringing law and judicial power 
to bear against wrongdoers, or creating legal 
precedent, these lawyers are unlikely to enter­
tain private dispute resolution at all. 
And, even if they were to see poten­
tial benefit from participating in mediation, 
neither these lawyers nor their clients—the 
public agency or citizens advocacy groups— 
would countenance NDAs in any mediated 
settlement.
Even (and only if) we have some faith 
in ethical public interest lawyers to prevent 
private settlements and NDAs in the next 
Arpaio case, we still anticipate queasiness in 
cases between private parties where wider or 
future harm is predictable.  
The plaintiff ’s lawyer in a products liabil­
ity case and the manufacturer’s inside counsel 
do not prioritize the interests of those not in 
the mediation room. Note that Rule 1.6 (b) 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, in relevant part: 
A lawyer may reveal information relating 
to the representation of a client to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes nec­
essary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm. 
Some state Model Rules require disclo­
sure under these circumstances, rather than 
permitting it.  Theoretically then, in a product 
liability case, or a case involving environmental 
claims, the Model Rules provide cover or create 
an obligation to disclose. 
History, however, suggests these fail to
operate to protect the public. It may not be 
intentional; corporate counsel may be subject 
to partisan perception bias and client protest, 
not to mention fear of termination.  And while 
STATES MOVE TO DE-ENFORCE NDAS 
Since Stormy Daniels’ entry into public
awareness, many state legislatures have taken 
up the issue of nondisclosure agreements. 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Flor­
ida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Texas have considered barring NDAs for 
employment-related sexual harassment and, 
in some instances, workplace discrimination 
claims.  
Legislation has passed in New York (NY 
CLS Gen Oblig. § 5-336), Illinois (820 ILCS 
96/1-25), California (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 1001), Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Lab. 
& Emp. § 3-715), New Jersey (N.J. Stat.
§10:5-12.7), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 50-4-36), Tennessee (for Local Education 
Agencies, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-131),
Oregon (ORS § 659A.370), Vermont (Sec. 
1. 21 V.S.A. § 495h), Virginia (Va. Code 
Ann. § 40.1-28.01), and Washington (Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 49.44.210). Rhode Island’s 
proposed bill S.B. 2563 is broader but still 
limited to the employment context. 
Illinois’ Workplace Transparency Act (820
ILCS 96/1-25) makes all unilateral employ­
ment-related NDAs void and states strong
requirements for an employment-related NDA
to be considered mutual and enforceable.
New York’s NY CLS Gen Oblig. § 5-336 
prohibits confidentiality clauses in con­
tracts and agreements entered into by public 
agencies. It also prohibits any clause requir­
ing parties to such a contract or agree­
ment to refrain from disclosing, discussing, 
describing or commenting upon its terms.
It exempts claims involving sexual harass­
ment nondisclosure agreements if the condi­
tion of confidentiality is the complainant’s 
preference.
psychological and financial injuries are real in 
employment discrimination or harassment,
these don’t seem to be captured by the rule. 
Always depending on the circumstances, 
here are some options for preventing or miti­
gating potential harm from settlements and 
NDAs in those cases: 
•	 Legislation stating the NDAs are unen­
forceable as against public policy when the 
Several states have enacted tax laws that 
bar income tax deductions for any settlement 
or payment related to sexual harassment or 
sexual abuse that is subject to a nondisclosure 
agreement.
Unfortunately, it’s noteworthy and dis­
turbing that the Arizona legislature’s action 
was not to prohibit or limit NDAs in employ­
ment-related  claims or in contracts with 
public agencies, but rather to affirmatively 
recognize their legality.  
It created a narrow exception only for
victims of sexual misconduct “responding to
a peace officer’s or a prosecutor’s inquiry” and
“making a statement not initiated by that party
in a criminal proceeding.” A.R.S. § 12-720(B). 
While generally well-motivated—Ari­
zona notwithstanding—most of the state
legislative efforts are aimed at closing the 
employment barn door, and mostly target 
secrecy of sexual harassment claims.  They 
entirely fail to address potential public harm 
from NDAs in a range of other legal actions. 
Some courts have expressed public policy 
concerns about NDAs, but most have sought 
to balance interests in facilitating settlements 
against interests in public access to informa­
tion.  In general, courts apply basic contract 
principles to questions of NDA enforcement, 
with an ear to unconscionability, duress,
and coercion. In the civil discovery arena 
and in criminal proceedings, however, some 
courts have refused to enforce NDAs that 
would interfere with other litigants’ ability 
to obtain information in support of their 
litigated claims or defenses.
—Marjorie Aaron & Federica Romanelli 
Aaron, a professor at the University of Cincinnati Law
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nondisclosure creates realistic danger of 
significant harm to other members of the 
public. (See the box above, “States Move to 
De-Enforce NDAs.”) 
•	 Legislation and amendment of mediator 
and attorney professional ethics rules to 
require disclosure of the danger of signifi­
cant harm to others suggested by reliable 
information learned in connection with 
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Commentary 
the case.  It’s arguable that, notwithstand­
ing mediator confidentiality obligations, a 
lawyer-mediator’s professional responsibil­
ity rules would currently require disclosure 
to relevant authorities disclosure where the 
harm appears to be imminent and extreme.
But any ambiguity on this point is better 
resolved. 
•	 Creation of a registry for settlements of 
certain types of claims, whether or not 
suit was filed, akin to the registries set 
up in some states for medical malpractice 
settlements. 
•	 Creation of an automatic release from
nondisclosure obligations if and when the 
party or an attorney learns that the of­
fender engaged in similar offenses against 
others prior to or after the settlement, 
unless previous offenses were disclosed
only in settlement discussions. (For this 
purpose, confidentiality provisions pro­
tecting settlement discussions, including 
mediation discussions would be, sorry to 
state it, trumped.) 
•	 Without waiting for legislative actions, me­
diators could include language that releases 
or even states the obligation to report be­
havior that predicts widespread or future 
harm in agreements to mediate, and me-
diation/dispute resolution organizations
such as JAMS Inc.; Alternatives’ publisher,
the CPR Institute, and the American Arbi­
tration Association could include it in their 
mediation and arbitration rules, and/or
encourage their panelists to put it in their 
agreements. 
•	 Waiver of nondisclosure provisions re­
garding a person seeking appointment
or election to public office, or serving
in public office. Such a provision would
bar President Trump, for example, from
invoking the NDAs which he favors as a
business strategy. See Michael Kranish,
“Trump long has relied on nondisclosure
deals to prevent criticism. That strat­
egy may be unraveling.” Washington Post
(Aug. 7, 2020) (available at https://bit. 
ly/3fDEOdW).
•	 Judicial approval of any case settlement 
that includes nondisclosure terms. 
STEPS COULD
BE TAKEN 
Sigh. I offer these recognizing that they will 
neither come to pass, nor be seriously enter­
tained—not in these times.  
Before someone launches a full barrel
attack on any of them, I hereby acknowledge 
that some may be flawed, lead to negative 
unintended consequences, or at minimum,
would require careful refinement.  As long as 
there’s no risk of any becoming real, it seems 
pointless to undertake that exercise. 
Having stated that, my gut suggests that, 
in the private sphere, neutrals and provider 
organizations could indeed take steps to per­
mit, encourage, or even require disclosures 
where serious harm would otherwise occur. To 
make this happen, we would want thorough 
discussion among neutrals and provider orga­
nizations, perhaps involving (or convened by) 
the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution or the 
CPR Institute. 
In the public sphere, the last one—judicial 
approval of settlements with nondisclosure
language—merits serious consideration. That’s
the rule for class actions and, while judicial 
oversight is not a perfect remedy in practice, it 
offers some protection to class members.  We 
are uncomfortable with nondisclosure terms 
in cases where they may hide current more 
widespread violations and lead to future harm. 
Our desire is to protect unknown and potential 
class members. 
Even if this proposal were worth explor­
ing, it still raises a series of practical questions: 
Would it only apply to cases in which a suit had 
been filed? Would it apply to claims subject 
to mandatory arbitration under pre-dispute 
agreement? If so, might the unhealthy conse­
quence be that the ugliest, most troublesome 
cases are settled with nondisclosure language, 
but without any court or arbitration filing? 
As a matter of professional responsibility,
could lawyers be required to raise concerns 
about more widespread future harm to the 
public? To what body? Might judicial or
extra-judicial panels be created to review even 
privately negotiated settlements of claims that 
were never filed, but lawyers were retained? 
And: Even if this proposal could be imag­
ined, would that encourage disputants to
bypass lawyers altogether?  Imagine Har­
vey Weinstein negotiating directly with an 
accuser, asking her to bury her claim—never to 
disclose it—in exchange for money or favors. 
Who would have more power?  Who protects 
the others?  
If the accuser breached the private agree­
ment, negotiated without counsel, should its 
nondisclosure terms be enforceable? If the
accuser was not represented by counsel when 
those terms were agreed to, how likely are they 
to be fair to her or palatable to the rest of us? 
* * * 
Leaving aside this digression into an optimist’s 
proposals (“Here’s a problem, can’t we fix
it?!”),  I return to original arguments against 
settlements in litigated cases and reflections 
about mediator/ADR promoter discomfort
prompted by Stormy-#MeToo NDAs.  
In cases where privacy is paramount for at 
least one party, less ADR may not mean more 
public trials but rather, more directly negoti­
ated pre-litigation settlements and thus less 
public access.  
We cannot force people to file suit, but 
we surely don’t want to render a decision to 
initiate litigation more difficult, given that
pleadings—the names and allegations in the 
complaint—are public information. 
The potentially harmful consequences of 
nondisclosure agreements in private settle­
ments are troubling. They are a legal system 
problem, however, for which ADR is not to 
blame. As a mediator of legal disputes lo these 
many years, I am absolved of guilt for the many 
settlements, with or without nondisclosure
terms, that have occurred in my mediation 
room.  
CLARIFICATION 
In the July/August 2020 article, “An
Unquestionable Mediation Conflict of 
Interest—The MGM Mandalay Bay
Shooting Settlement,” by Art Hinshaw 
(38 Alternatives 102 (July/August 2020) 
(available at https://bit.ly/2PD706c)), a 
word was dropped in a sentence near 
the end. It should have read: “The medi­
ator’s role as a facilitator, compared to a 
decision-maker, has no impact on the 
issue of whether there is a conflict.” 
Alternatives apologizes for the error.    
